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 1. Introduction 
 
 From its beginning as a systematic branch of knowledge, human geography 
was strongly influenced by developments in the other branches of the social sciences. 
Once a predominantly descriptive and ideographic discipline, human geography 
gradually took on a more positivist methodology. This in turn gave way to a series of 
approaches which included marxist, humanist and more recently postmodernist 
perspectives. As with similar paradigm shifts in other fields of knowledge, changes 
in geography were often attempts to deal with the deficiencies and criticisms of 
previous methodological and philosophical approaches. Because human geography 
emerged along with the social sciences, it was associated with the movement to 
distance scientific knowledge from metaphysical issues. From Descartes on a 
consensus emerged to exclude metaphysical questions as a necessary step towards 
the development of truly scientific disciplines. Within geography this view drew 
support from the influence of Kant and later on from the particularly hostile view of 
metaphysics held by the positivists of the Vienna Circle. Positivism was to take a 
firm grip on the development of human geography, moulding it to become "spatial 
science". 
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 Since the 1970s, a number of different approaches have provided a strong 
critique of positivist geography. Humanist geography in various forms attempted to 
counter the strongly deterministic perspectives on humanity presented by positivist 
and marxist influences. Some of these approaches have touched on the neglect of 
ontological issues, yet to date they have failed to examine the effect on the discipline 
of excluding a metaphysical perspective. The most recent development of 
postmodern geography, while it presents a strong critique of positivist geography, 
and argues for a greater tolerance of "difference", is nevertheless still quite hostile 
towards the possibility of incorporating a metaphysical perspective within human 
geography. This paper suggests the need to reconsider the exclusion of a 
metaphysical perspective in human geography, if the discipline is to make a more 
effective contribution towards helping policy makers deal with the many grave 
issues facing humanity. 
 
 
2. Metaphysics and modern thought 
 
 Parmenides, the most significant of all pre-Socratic philosophers, who lived at 
the end of the sixth century and in the first half of the fifth, is known as the father of 
metaphysics1. Up until his time, Greek speculation had been cosmological, physical, 
with a philosophic purpose and method. In the hands of Parmenides philosophy 
comes to be metaphysics and ontology, through which he sought to distinguish 
opinion and belief from knowledge. Among the various types of metaphysical theory 
which have emerged since the time of Parmenides are Platonism, Aristotelianism, 
Thomism, Cartesianism, Idealism and Materialism. 
 
 Metaphysics can be taken as that central part of philosophy whose object is to 
determine the real nature of things, challenging all assumptions and determining the 
meaning, structure and principles of whatever is insofar as it is2. It is that science 
which seeks to define what is ultimately real, as opposed to what is apparent. Many 
scientists have restricted themselves to what can be dealt with in quantitative terms, 
which can be a poor reflection of the richness of everyday life. People experience the 
world at different levels and in different capacities. They are not only researchers but 
also agents. They live morally, legally, aesthetically and religiously as well as 
scientifically. One cannot separate the practice of geography from the scholar's total 
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being3. Humans are multi-faceted beings and need to understand the universe in the 
light of their different activities and experiences. 
 
 In contrast to specialised disciplines which study reality in part, metaphysics 
aspires to deal with the world as a whole. According to Plato it offers a synoptic view 
of reality, arising from the need to see things in a holistic way and to avoid the 
narrowness of the specialist. In the 1920s Scheler noted that we lacked a unified idea 
of human being and that the multiplicity of special sciences tends to hide rather than 
to reveal the nature of human being4. One can argue that geography, with its 
traditional claim to holism, and as the bridging discipline between the natural and 
social sciences, has much to gain from metaphysical perspectives. 
 
 For Schumacher metaphysics and ethics deal with our most basic convictions, 
issues such as the meaning and purpose of life, and the fact that all human life strives 
after something thought of as good. These are the ideas with the power to move us, 
"ideas that transcend the world of facts, that cannot be proved or disproved by 
ordinary scientific methods"5. This does not mean that they are merely "subjective" or 
"relative", since they have to be true to reality. 
 
 Human geography and the social sciences in general constantly grapple with 
fundamental issues to do with the nature of humanity. Humanistic geography, in 
particular, has the objective of "bringing human beings in all their complexity to the 
centre stage of human geography"6. These sciences expressly refuse to ask and 
answer the ultimate questions of human existence. Metaphysics, however, addresses 
aspects of humanity beyond the empirical, and at the same time tries to give meaning 
to the empirical realm and to make sense of empirical data. Metaphysics takes from 
the various branches of knowledge its basic data about humanity and then provides 
a synthesising framework in which to open up the perspective of values and ends7. 
The social sciences correctly adopt the methodological position that limits their area 
of competence. There is no reason why this should result in an attitude of exclusion 
towards the metaphysical perspective, which is open to the ethical and spiritual 
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dimensions of humanity. It is precisely the excluding or ignoring of this perspective 
which has resulted in deterministic and reductionist conceptualisations of humanity 
continuing to influence geography and the social sciences. 
 
 It is generally agreed that Descartes' philosophy marks the beginning of the 
development of the exact and natural sciences as well as the humanistic sciences in 
their systematic form. He turned his back on metaphysics and concentrated on the 
philosophy of knowledge. Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" became the motto of 
modern rationalism, and introduced the great anthropocentric shift in European 
thought. The Cartesian dualism placed epistemology at centre stage instead of 
metaphysics. The development of new disciplines such as geography coincided with 
the exclusion of metaphysics and it has been argued that such an exclusion was a 
necessary element in the "scientific" development of geography8. 
 
 Within philosophy itself, there was increasing unease with the suggestion that 
metaphysics was the first philosophical discipline —"the queen of the sciences"— 
and with the implication that it had the last word about what goes on in all other 
branches of knowledge9. Before Descartes it had been widely held that it was the 
business of metaphysics to justify the ultimate assumptions of sciences and that in 
metaphysics alone there were no unjustified assumptions. Such a view was partly 
responsible for the growing hostility towards metaphysics, and the rejection of the 
widely held view that metaphysics was superior to other disciplines. By the 
seventeenth century the term "metaphysics" had been discredited through its 
vaunted use by the rationalists who had constructed abstract systems of ideas 
divorced from experience. Since then metaphysics has been slandered and 
misrepresented. Despite the occasional association with New Age thinking in recent 
times, metaphysics has no special relation with religion. 
 
 
 
3. Positivism and rejection of metaphysics 
 
 The sharpest attack on metaphysical speculation in the twentieth century was 
came from the school of "positive" philosophy of Auguste Comte, who in the 
nineteenth century had presented metaphysical thought as a necessary, but now 
superseded, stage in the progression of the human mind from primitive superstition 
                                                
8 R. Butlin, Human Geography, «Geographical Viewpoint», 1 (1965), pp. 59-67. 
9 B. W. Wilshire, o. c., pp. 4-5. 
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to modern science. While Livingstone sees no clear link between Comptean 
philosophy and modern geography he points to a clear connection with twentieth 
century positivists. During the second half of the present century the mainstream of 
philosophy in Western culture was dominated by Logical Positivism. Livingstone 
explains the emergence of this movement, as an attempt to overcome the 
philosophical difficulties associated with the conception of science which had 
prevailed since the seventeenth century10. According to this view all science was 
based on the empirical observation of nature, and by analysing the data, formulating 
hypotheses and testing them against reality it was held that universal laws could be 
uncoded. This analysis of Logical Positivists, however, was itself not philosophically 
neutral: they saw metaphysics as the enemy of science and the only way to 
understand the world, in their view, was in scientific terms. Metaphysics was not 
valid knowledge but merely an expression of human feelings or aspirations. 
 
 The verification principle was the main weapon against metaphysics. The only 
statements that had meaning were those which could be verified by scientific 
methods. Positivists experienced great difficulty, however, in devising a logically 
satisfactory formulation of the verification principle. It was what logicians call a "self-
referentially incoherent thesis". That is to say the principle itself fails to follow its 
own precept: to make the claim "only sentences which are verifiable have meaning" 
is itself not tenable in any scientific way. This was acknowledged quite early on by A. 
J. Ayer, professor of logic at Oxford, even if social scientists did not realise it. For 
them it simply became a sort of flag for "scientific" social research. The realisation 
that supposedly objective observations were not themselves free from theory 
brought logical positivism under scrutiny. Its self-imposed limitation to sense-
perceptible data also disables it from providing a satisfactory explanation of many 
aspects of human life, including scientific knowledge itself. 
 
 While Logical Positivism is now defunct, the deference of Logical Positivists to 
empirical science created "an intellectual climate inimical to the pursuit of 
speculative metaphysics"11. Lowe is strongly critical of the philosophical naivety of 
many scientists, who, unaware of the metaphysical assumptions in their own works, 
display a contempt for philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular. 
 
 It could be argued that within geography, there was a greater openness to all 
dimensions of human existence before a strongly positivist methodological 
                                                
10 D. Livingstone, The Geographical Tradition, Blackwell, Oxford 1992, p. 12. 
11 E. J. L. Lowe, Metaphysics, opposition to, in T. Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion 
to Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995, p. 559. 
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perspective took hold. The growing influence of positivism during this century 
meant that geography has shared with other branches of knowledge the desire of 
absolute independence from any metaphysical knowledge. This independence has 
proved difficult to attain. 
 
 Logical positivism's influence on geography reached a high point in the 1960s 
and 1970s during the period termed the "quantitative revolution". Cartesian thinking 
changed it from being a largely descriptive, though culturally sensitive discipline, to 
becoming focused on the sophisticated quantitative analysis of variables for which 
data were either readily available or easily measured. Like other social scientists, 
geographers settled for explaining 30 per cent of the variability of large census 
datasets, without wondering too much about the 70 per cent which was left 
unexplained. 
 
 Tracing the early history of quantification, Livingstone questioned its claim to 
objectivity because social and political interests affected the methodology12. The 
reductionist and methodological assumptions that pervade quantitative analysis 
resulted in an approach weak in social criticism. As well as the ontological 
reductionism associated with this approach there is a danger of suppressing 
humankind's "existential awareness" and "moral nature". Contemporary culture is 
dominated by the methods and thought patterns of the natural sciences, and is 
strongly influenced by currents of philosophy which proclaim the principle of 
verification as the sole basis of truth. The effect of this exclusively scientific and non-
metaphysical mindset is to limit the attention of contemporary society to only those 
positive realities which appear useful in quantitative and technical terms. Only in 
more recent times has an awareness of the untenability of the assumption of science's 
ethical and cognitive neutrality become more widespread. 
 
 In his Small is Beautiful, Schumacher put forward a critique of the exclusion of 
metaphysics from contemporary thinking and argued strongly in favour of its re-
integration. In a time when science is ever more triumphant, he saw the greater part 
of existentialist philosophy displaying estrangement, loneliness, despair and 
cynicism. Schumacher called for a highlighting of metaphysics, because in its absence 
science was being taught without any awareness of the presuppositions of science. 
He was particularly concerned that economics was being taught without any 
awareness of the view of human nature that underlies economic theory. He further 
                                                
12 D. Livingstone, o. c., p. 324. 
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argued that a subject that does not make explicit its view of human nature could 
hardly be called humanistic. 
 
 The Vienna Circle defined themselves as "scientists" rather than "humanists" 
and for them metaphysics represented a conservative heritage incapable of 
assimilating the philosophical impact of scientific revolutions13. MacIntyre, however, 
notes that with the failure of the Enlightenment, the twentieth century has found 
itself in the most radical ethical despair. MacIntyre sees twentieth century culture 
deprived of any widely shared rational morality14. Various non-transcendent forms 
have emerged including positivism, Marxist materialism and postmodernism, all of 
which have had a significant impact on the evolution of human geography. 
 
 
5. Back to Kant 
 
 In any attempt to restore a metaphysical perspective to human geography, a 
useful starting point is to return to Kant. In addition to being one of the great 
philosophers of the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) also taught 
geography at Koenigsberg for thirty years. Kant has the distinction in geography of 
being the source of both ideographic and nomothetic approaches in the discipline, 
and his Critique of Pure Reason has been described as providing a springboard for 
postmodernity15. 
 
 Humanistic geography in the 1970s, in seeking a return to the centrality of 
experience, meaning and the subjective, and in order to develop an alternative to the 
predominant positive approach, turned to Kant as a source of inspiration. These 
authors have also argued that the transcendental critical philosophy of Kant could 
provide a philosophical foundation for a contemporary human geography seeking 
an understanding of the world through an understanding of self. One of the key 
ideas of Kant which has been widely retained, is that we can only make sense of the 
world by imposing some structure originating from the mind on it. He made a 
fundamental distinction between rational and empirical sciences and saw geography 
                                                
13 G. Borradori, The American Philosopher, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
1991, p. 7. 
14 A. MacIntyre, Nietzsche or Aristotle? in G. Borradori, o. c., p. 146. 
15 D. N. Livingstone and R. T. Harrison, Immanuel Kant, Subjectivism, and Human 
Geography: A Preliminary Investigation , «Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers», New Series 6 (1981) pp. 359-374; Gregory, Geographical Imaginations, 
Blackwell, Cambridge 1994, p. 143. 
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as a vehicle for unifying our understanding of the world, as a synoptic discipline 
synthesising the findings of other disciplines. 
 
 According to Kant, the ultimate philosophical question is "what is man?". The 
human being is distinguishable from, and elevated above all other creatures by 
virtue of possessing self-consciousness. Human being is aware of himself as an "I", as 
distinct from everything outside his own consciousness, and because he possesses 
the notion "I" each human being is a person. It is character in the moral sense of self-
awareness that radically distinguishes the human being from nature. The human 
being's destiny is to overcome the rawness of nature, and to realise one's rationality 
through the development of good out of "evil" by one's action16. 
 
 The Kantian philosophical framework, therefore, contributes towards the 
reinstatement of the human being as the creator of his own world through the active 
participation of the knowing subject in that which is known. The similarity between 
Kantian and phenomenological thought has been stressed by Livingstone and 
Harrison. In both it is assumed that knowledge does not exist independently of the 
human being, but has to be gained from human experience. Thus the world can be 
understood only in reference to the human being17. 
 
5. Buttimer's values 
 In the 1970s, Anne Buttimer attempted to answer the demand for a restoration 
of the human being as "the unique and potentially creative centre of the systems we 
model"18. In contrast to the many claims for anthropocentrism in geography, she 
pointed out that geographers had construed the human being in a highly 
reductionist fashion, and she noted how questions of the nature of being had 
generally remained within the exclusive domain of the philosopher and had been 
given little attention by geographers. 
 
 Buttimer noted that despite their declared interest in the totality of forms, 
geographers had usually focused more on the external forms than on the essences of 
phenomena. Their limited interest in values was confined to those expressed in the 
landscape, while the wider metaphysical issues were not considered an appropriate 
area of concern. She criticised this approach which neglected to examine the nature 
                                                
16 J. A. May, Kant's Concept of Geography and its Relation to Recent Geographical Thought, 
University of Toronto Press, Toronto 1970. 
17 E. Relph, An Inquiry into the Relations Between Phenomenology and Geography, «The 
Canadian Geographer», 14 (1970), pp. 193-201. 
18 A. Buttimer, o. c., p. 36. 
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of the behaving form as a prerequisite for explaining observed behaviour. A variety 
of approaches were adopted in geography emphasising a rational notion of the 
human being. Some adopted a functionalist view accepting that since one could only 
know phenomena, then there is only the phenomenal world. In France, on the other 
hand, some debate took place about the assertion that the spiritual nature of man 
was significant in geography. Those who advocated man's spiritual nature 
emphasised the explanatory power of factors such as memory, symbol, hope and 
ideals as a challenge to explanations based on a naturalistic or technological 
necessity. 
 
 Although human geography during the 1970s was characterised by 
considerable optimism as it adopted the more sophisticated quantitative 
methodology of "spatial science", Buttimer was not at all convinced that the new 
rationality was in a position to deepen our understanding of the problems of 
humanity, some of which had resulted from the effects of Enlightenment science. The 
challenge, in her view, was to transcend the determinisms which had clouded our 
thinking and to look to scholars like Scheler, Reinach and Hartmann, who claimed 
that there is an objective, transcendent order of values which are "eternal and 
immutable"19. 
 
 Almost twenty years later in Geography and the Human Spirit, Buttimer 
reiterated that "ontological issues are again discussible" and the problem once again 
was how to interpret the Protagorean motto "The proper study of mankind is man"20. 
While Buttimer was the first geographer to examine the effects on human geography 
of neglecting ontological questions, her own suggested solution has been to favour a 
humanistic geography centred on phenomenology to enable geography to "perform 
as leaven in the mass of contemporary science and humanities"21. 
 
 
6. The postmodern critique 
 
 Some query "the" Enlightenment, because it may have meant different things 
in different places. Its naturalistic thrust in France, for example, was quite different 
from the way it was used by Common Sense philosophers like Reid in Scotland and 
by moral philosophers in America. Nevertheless, the Enlightenment was 
                                                
19 A. Buttimer, o. c., p. 38. 
20 A. Buttimer, Geography and the Human Spirit, The John Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore 1993, pp. 203-204,  
21 A. Buttimer, 1993, o. c., p. 24. 
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characterised by a preoccupation with order, truth, reason and logic. A law-seeking 
form of science emerged which tried to apply scientific thinking to the humanities. 
Postmodernism is the most recent critique of the Enlightenment within the social 
sciences. Postmodernism has attempted to undermine the widely-shared 
philosophical assumption that there is a degree of order in the world and that there 
is a rationality to creation which structures and governs its works. It is particularly 
critical of what it calls the "metanarratives", which seek to explain human existence, 
and which it regards as being insensitive to differences between people and places. 
 
 Lyotard, for example, has insisted that modernist metanarratives are seriously 
compromised by the profound differences that fracture human populations into so 
many groups and subgroups. It has also been suggested that Foucault's criticism of 
"total history" was prompted by sensitivity to the geography of the world. This, 
however, stems less from a direct engagement with geography than from what has 
been called "the revenge of the particular". What has now moved to centre stage are 
all the "particulars" that were supposed not to feature in the academy: gender, race 
and so on. Now these are dominating the discourse and seeking to subvert every 
generalisation22. 
 
 This aspect of postmodernism, nevertheless, is reminiscent of pre-positivist 
human geography which was characterised by a sensibility for the personality and 
character of particular places and peoples. It could be argued that pre-positivist 
human geography was inherently metaphysical in its perspective insofar as it 
allowed those being studied to speak for themselves and did not exclude 
transcendent dimensions of human existence. While the positive contribution of the 
postmodern critique of Enlightenment thinking, and in particular of the application 
of a positivist epistemology to geography, is to be welcomed, it is clear that 
postmodernism is quite antagonistic towards metaphysics. Jacques Derrida rejected 
metaphysics as "the white mythology which reassembles and reflects the culture of 
the West"23. Commenting on the hostility of postmodernists and deconstructionists to 
metaphysics, Lowe notes that these writers represent metaphysics as a "temporary 
aberration of the Western intellect" denying the notion that it is a pursuit of perennial 
questions for which timeless answers may be legitimately sought"24. 
 
                                                
22 J. F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, University of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1984; P. Cloke, C. Philo and D. Sadler, o. c., pp. 194-
195. 
23 J. Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, Chicago University Press 1982, p. 213. 
24 E. J. L. Lowe, o. c., p. 559. 
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 Questions of representation are at the root of all postmodernisms, all of which 
portray incredulity towards notions of truth. As for Nietzsche, all values, including 
truth, goodness and subjectivity possess inherently unstable appearances for 
postmodernists, and because of their opposition to these philosophical notions, some 
postmodernists hold strong anti-humanist views25. Much of the postmodern 
discourse also reflects a radical relativism, despite the rejection of this criticism by 
Gregory in his Geographical Imaginations. Harvey noted that postmodernists 
continued to deploy truth terms of their own, suggesting a continued belief in an 
ultimate truth which they theoretically claim cannot exist26. 
 
 Bernstein criticises the many postmodern thinkers "who slip back into a crude 
form of binary thinking when they damn universality, identity, totality, and praise 
particularity, difference and fragmentation"27. In his view the totalising critique that 
seeks to expose all norms and standards is self-defeating. Bauman refers to the crisis 
among intellectuals who no longer feel themselves able to provide "an authoritative 
solution to the questions of cognitive truth, moral judgement and aesthetic taste"28. 
 
 While raising some critical points about postmodernism, Gregory's 
Geographical Imaginations is generally a positive evaluation of this recent influence 
within geography. He sees postmodernism as an effective critique of Descartes' 
foundationalism, which sought to legitimise its own claims to knowledge by 
devaluing whatever lay beyond its sovereign grasp. Gregory concludes that 
postmodernism's celebration of difference is peculiarly suited to the late twentieth 
century, to help us to come to terms with the "bewilderment of the contemporary"29. 
One might wonder about the extent to which postmodernist thinking has been 
responsible for this state of bewilderment. For Livingstone, those who abandon the 
notion of rationality altogether are as open to the charge of incoherence as were the 
classical foundationalists30. Lowe suggests that the enemies of metaphysics could be 
accused of promoting a particular metaphysical dogma, and insists that since the 
normative categories of reason and truth transcend naturalistic reduction, they 
"cannot , without pragmatic incoherence, be argued out of existence"31. 
                                                
25 L. D. Berg, Between Modernism and Postmodernism , «Progress in Human 
Geography», 17 (1993), pp. 490-507. 
26 D. Harvey, Postmodern Morality Plays, «Antipode», 24 (1992), pp. 73-81. 
27 R. J. Bernstein, The Resurgence of Pragmatism , «Social Research», 59 (1992), p. 837. 
28 Z. Bauman, Is There a Postmodern Sociology? , «Theory, Culture and Society», 5 
(1988), p. 219, quoted in L. D. Berg, o. c., p. 494. 
29 D. Gregory, o. c., p. 139. 
30 D. Livingstone, o. c., p. 345. 
31 E. J. L. Lowe, o. c., p. 559. 
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7. Giddens and ontology 
 
 The separation of ontology and epistemology and the consequent neglect of 
ontological issues has resulted in a postmodernist "cul-de-sac"32. In helping historians 
to seek an alternative to Cartesian dualism, Collins and Hoopes turn to Anthony 
Giddens, who engaged the writings of the postmodernists in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Giddens pointed out that "what I"m trying to do is to work on essentially what 
I describe as an ontology of human society"33. He was very critical of the over-
deterministic fascination that structural sociologies —notably Marxist ones— had 
with social structures and social systems. He tried to incorporate into his social 
theory the notion of human action as something rationalised and ordered by people 
in the world (human agents). He wanted to treat people as "knowledgeable and 
capable subjects, not as cultural dupes of structural determinism", and he wanted to 
construe the changing circumstances of social life as "skilled accomplishments" by 
these subjects34. Such a concern characterised a series of humanistic critiques of 
positivist geography in the 1970s, which were strongly opposed to the disappearance 
of the human agent as a "thinking, feeling, subject". Entrikin, for example, talks about 
an "overly objective, narrow, mechanistic and deterministic view of the human 
agent"35. 
 
 Giddens rejected postmodernism's "logical chasm" which separates the 
individual from the social "by its fallacious assumption that if there is no pre-existing 
or transcendental subject there can be no subject at all"36. The postmodernist 
tendency is to erase human agency from society and he pointed out that "the 
pressing task facing social theory today is not to further the conceptual elimination of 
the subject, but on the contrary to promote a recovery of the subject without lapsing 
into subjectivism"37. Giddens' structuration theory, which has had considerable 
influence on human geography in recent years, amounts to an assertion that human 
actions are structural and social structures are actions. Thus human agents are 
                                                
32 S. L. Collins and J. Hoopes, Anthony Giddens and Charles Sanders Peirce: History, 
Theory, and a Way Out of the Linguistic Cul-de-sac , «Journal of the History of Ideas», 56 
(1995), pp. 625-650. 
33 A. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in 
Social Analysis, Macmillan, London 1979; quoted in D. Gregory, o. c., p. 124. 
34 P. Cloke, C. Philo and D. Sadler, o. c., p. 97. 
35 J. N. Entrikin, Contemporary Humanism in Geography, «Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers», 66 (1976), p. 616. 
36 A. Giddens, o. c., 1979, p. 47. 
37 A. Giddens, o. c., 1979, pp. 69-70,  
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practically involved in producing and reproducing those structures that make 
human action possible. Collins and Hoopes reject any theory which separates 
epistemology from ontology resulting in conceptualising thought and reality as 
separate38. In their view, action and thought are practically one and making a 
distinction between them has resulted in lapsing into a dualistic ontology. They go 
on to argue that social actors use knowledge to engage in social practices which are 
not random but ordered and stable. 
 
 
8. Towards an inclusive metaphysical perspective 
 
 The traditional role of metaphysics was to provide a synthesis for the different 
specialisms within knowledge, and although it is generally regarded as outdated 
among many scholars, including philosophers, it can strengthen human geography's 
traditional holism by creating a greater openness to all dimensions of human 
existence. Geographers have become more concerned about how human beings come 
to know and act in the world and there is less of a tendency to ignore or assume 
away the complexity of human beings. A greater openness to this complexity, will 
provide a more solid basis for the consideration of the many ethical and moral 
dilemmas facing humanity as we enter the third millennium. 
 
 From a postmodernist point of view, the suggestion of the need for an 
inclusive metaphysical perspective might be accused of being ethnocentric on the 
basis that each culture has its own "metaphysics", and all of them should be treated 
equally. It is argued, however, that just as separate cultures do not have a unique 
chemistry or biology, neither do they have a distinct metaphysics. Metaphysics is a 
research tradition within the mainstream of philosophy, which has been pursued 
with a scientific approach since the time of the early Greeks, and which pervades all 
cultures and religious backgrounds. Rather than being a matter of choice, it is a 
question of going deeper and of trying to get a clearer view. This does not mean that 
metaphysics has no assumptions. It has, but it tries to understand its own 
assumptions. Metaphysics is the scientific research tradition which seeks to 
understand our general assumptions. The best prospect we have of ridding ourselves 
of our assumptions is by gaining a clear view of what those assumptions are. 
 
 The contribution of humanist geographers to date in deepening the awareness 
in the discipline to "what it means to be human" must be acknowledged. For Yi-Fu-
                                                
38 S. L. Collins and J. Hoopes, o. c., p. 628. 
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Tuan humanistic geography is about the description of "how geographical activities 
and phenomena reveal the quality of human awareness"39. The main purpose of 
exercises carried out by humanistic geographers has been to tease out the 
"transcendental" essences in how people experience space, place and environment40. 
 
 One of the specific policy areas to which a more metaphysical human 
geography can make a significant contribution is that of development. There is a long 
tradition within human geography, particularly among geographers of a marxist 
persuasion, of a deep concern with the unequal distribution of the means of 
subsistence, one of the greatest injustices in contemporary society. Considerable 
analysis has been carried out of the mechanisms within capitalism which have 
accentuated the widening gap between North and South and between social groups 
within wealthy countries such as the United States. The growing levels of 
unemployment throughout the world point to one of the major failures of economic 
development policy in recent decades. 
 
 There is a growing awareness that the type of development model which has 
been promoted in recent decades with its narrow focus on economic factors is no 
longer sustainable. One of the effects of such economistic development policy has 
been the efforts to impose population control programmes on Third World countries 
with little consideration for the values of the peoples concerned. 
 
 A metaphysical perspective within human geography would emphasise the 
moral character of development and the need for solidarity resulting from a greater 
awareness of the radical interdependence of humanity. A metaphysical human 
geography can help policy makers become more aware of the deficiencies of 
narrowly based economic policies, and of the need to replace mechanistic models 
with strategies which will emphasise a more sustainable approach towards 
development. For example, people or nations cannot be conceptualised as 
opportunities for exploitation within a consumerist context, while natural resources 
should not be exploited as if they were inexhaustible. 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
                                                
39 Y. F. Tuan, Humanistic Geography, «Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers», 66 (1976), p. 267. 
40 P. Cloke, C. Philo and D. Sadler, o. c., p. 81 
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 In answering the question why human geographers should be reconsidering 
the exclusion of metaphysics from their discipline, this paper has focused on the 
effects of that exclusion. It is argued that as a consequence of the rejection of 
transcendent metaphysics, various non-transcendent forms such as positivism, 
Marxist materialism and postmodernism have had a significant impact on the 
development of the discipline, with some of these forms denying the very existence 
of metaphysics. Ontological reductionism has brought with it the danger of 
suppressing existential awareness and an awareness of the moral nature of 
humanity. In the absence of a metaphysical perspective, human geography has 
developed without an awareness of its own presuppositions, and without an 
awareness of the view of humanity which underlies its social theory. 
 
 While the contribution of the humanist perspective has made a significant 
contribution towards dealing with some of the effects of excluding metaphysics, its 
impact has been to some extent superseded by postmodernism. Postmodernism itself 
has made a positive contribution insofar as it has produced a trenchant critique of 
positivism, and it possesses a strong resemblance to pre-positivist human geography 
with its greater sensibility to the personality and character of places, and to the need 
to allow those being studied to tell their own story. But since postmodernism is a 
logical outcome of the replacement of ontology by epistemology, it is antagonistic 
towards metaphysics. It is argued, on the other hand, that a greater openness to 
metaphysics within human geography will help to recapture a deeper sensitivity to 
difference, which postmodernist scholars are seeking. 
 
 One of the most interesting lessons to be learned from examining the 
exclusion of metaphysics in human geography is that the more scholars have 
attempted to exclude such a perspective, the more reductionist and deterministic 
human geography has become. Human geography's capacity to provide an effective 
critique in such areas as development policy has been seriously handicapped by 
excluding metaphysics. A greater openness to all dimensions of human existence 
would strengthen human geography's holism and would provide a solid foundation 
for the consideration of the many ethical and moral dilemmas facing humanity. 
 
*** 
 
Abstract From the time of Descartes a strong tendency emerged to exclude the consideration 
of metaphysical questions as a necessary step towards developing truly scientific disciplines. 
Within human geography, positivism had a significant influence in moulding the discipline 
as "spatial science", resulting in a reductionist vision of humanity. Since the 1970s, in 
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reaction to the limitations of this narrow vision and also to the deterministic perspective of 
marxism, humanistic approaches became important, but have failed to adequately deal with 
the exclusion of metaphysical issues. The more recent emergence of postmodern influences 
within human geography, while being critical of the rigidities associated with Enlightenment 
thinking, and suggesting a greater tolerance of "difference", appears reluctant to reconsider 
the exclusion of metaphysics. This paper suggest that such a reconsideration could contribute 
significantly towards increasing human geography's capacity to help policy makers deal more 
adequately with some of the major issues facing humanity. 
 
